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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Darin William Parton appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of attempted strangulation and felony 
domestic battery with a persistent violator enhancement, claiming error in the 
admission of certain evidence, insufficiency of the evidence of the enhancement, 
and fundamental error in relation to the prosecutor's questioning and closing 
argument. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Theresa Linnenburger and her boyfriend, Parton, were out one evening 
when Parton started "getting loud," "obnoxious," and drinking heavily. (Trial Tr.,1 
Vol. I, p.70, Ls.14-20; p.71, Ls.3-7.) As a result of Parton's behavior, Theresa 
was having "panic attacks because [she] knew that, if he started drinking any 
more, what was going to happen." (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.70, Ls.18-20.) Theresa 
"was scared." (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.70, Ls.20-21.) Theresa decided she did not 
want to be around Parton anymore, told him she was leaving, and went home 
without him. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.76, L.15 - p.77, L.14.) 
After Theresa got home, her son and his girlfriend came over. (Trial Tr., 
Vol. I, p.78, Ls.12-14.) While they were there, Parton came home stumbling and 
1 There are several transcripts included in the record on appeal. Consistent with 
the Appellant's Brief, the transcript that contains the two-day trial, sentencing and 
a pre-trial hearing will be referred to as "Trial Tr., Vol. I" and the transcript that 
contains the opening statements, closing arguments, and the portion of the trial 
relating to the persistent violator enhancement will be referred to as "Trial Tr., 
Vol. 11." All other transcripts will be referred to using the date of the relevant 
hearing. 
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slurring and asked why Theresa left. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.79, L.19 - p.SO, L.14.) 
Theresa told him it was because she "didn't want to be around him at that time." 
(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.SO, Ls.14-17.) Parton left again, telling Theresa he was going 
for a walk. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.SO, Ls.1S-22.) Theresa continued visiting with her 
son and his girlfriend until they left at "around 11 :00." (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.S2, LS.1-
14.) Theresa then fell asleep on the couch. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.S2, Ls.15-19.) 
Sometime after 2:00 a.m., Parton returned. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.S2, L.25 -
p.S3, L.11.) Parton tried to hug Theresa at which time she told him to "go to 
bed." (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.S3, L.12 - p.S4, L.7.) Parton became angry and began 
calling Theresa "a fucking bitch, [and] a whore" and told her to "get the fuck out." 
(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.S5, Ls.5-S.) When Theresa started to leave, Parton grabbed 
her legs and told her not to, claiming he loved her. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.S6, L.17 -
p.S7, L.9.) Theresa, however, continued to try to leave and Parton became 
angry again and pushed her. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.S7, L.10 - p.SS, L.9.) Theresa 
tried to get up and Parton grabbed her hair with one hand and started punching 
her in the face with his other hand. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.S9, Ls.5-7.) Parton 
continued to attack Theresa, at one point "choking" her and "squeezing" and she 
"couldn't breathe." (See generally Trial Tr., Vol. I, pp.S9-97.) Parton then started 
kicking and "stomping on" Theresa while she was on the floor. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, 
p.103, Ls.10-12.) Parton also kicked Theresa in the head and grabbed her by 
the "hair on both sides and ... started pounding [her] head into the floor." (Trial 
Tr., Vol. I, p.105, Ls.1S-20; p.107, Ls.6-S.) Theresa lost consciousness at one 
point and awoke to Parton "putting [her] head between his knees and then just 
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dropping all his weight in [her] face and hit the floor." (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.107, 
Ls.15-25.) 
Eventually, Theresa made her way to the back bedroom. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, 
p.110, Ls.11-15.) Parton followed her, continuing his attack. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, 
p.111, Ls.5-23; p.112, L.17 - p.114, L.22.) Theresa finally made it out the back 
door. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.112, Ls.3-16; p.115, L.22 - p.116, L.6.) Parton again 
followed Theresa. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.116, L.10 - p.118, LA.) When Parton 
caught her, he told her he was sorry, that he loved her, and asked her to come 
home. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.118, Ls.5-8.) Theresa allowed Parton to walk her back 
home. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.118, Ls.12-15.) As Parton was helping Theresa over a 
fence, he said: "That's right, bitch. You better get your ass back in the house." 
(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.119, Ls.2-11.) Theresa panicked and ran. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, 
p. 11 9, Ls. 1 5-1 9.) 
Fortunately, there was a police substation across the street from 
Theresa's home. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.120, Ls.1-11.) When Theresa got to the 
substation, she knocked on the door. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.120, Ls.24-25.) After 
nobody answered her knocks on the front door, Theresa went to a different door 
and began knocking. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.121, LsA-12.) When nobody answered 
that door either; Theresa sat down next to it, "thinking that they're going to find 
me" because there was a patrol car running outside. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.121, L.23 
- p.122, L.9) Ultimately, the officers inside did find Theresa laying outside by the 
door. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.122, Ls.10-14.) Immediately after the officers found 
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Theresa, she said: "I need help, ... [m]y boyfriend beat me up." (Trial Tr., Vol. I, 
p.182, Ls.16-23.) 
The officers noticed Theresa had injuries and contacted the paramedics 
who arrived on scene and transported Theresa to the hospital. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, 
p.183, L.23 - p.184, L.12; p.185, Ls.15-17; p.187, L.24 - p.188, L.2.) While 
waiting for the paramedics, Theresa identified Parton as her attacker. (Trial Tr., 
Vol. I, p.187, Ls.18-23.) Following further investigation, law enforcement 
arrested Parton at home. (See generally Trial Tr., Vol. I, pp.188-199.) 
The state charged Parton with attempted strangulation and felony 
domestic battery. (R., pp.10-11, 27-28, 40-41.) The state also alleged Parton is 
a persistent violator. (R., pp.38-39, 44-46.) Prior to trial, the state filed a motion 
in limine seeking leave to admit statements Theresa made to law enforcement 
and to medical personnel after Parton attacked her. (R., pp.59-65.) The state 
indicated its intent to offer the statements "pursuant to the following hearsay 
exceptions: Idaho Rule of Evidence (I.R.E.) 803(1) present sense impression, 
I.R.E. 803(2) excited utterance, and I.R.E. 803(4) statements for purpose of 
medical diagnosis or treatment." (R., p.59.) The court conducted a hearing on 
the state's motion after which it ruled that Theresa's initial statement to law 
enforcement that her boyfriend beat her up was admissible as an excited 
utterance (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.56, L.18 - p.57, LA), and that Theresa's statements 
"to the EMTs and to the physician or treating nurses" would be admissible (Trial 
Tr., Vol. I, p.57, Ls.11-14). 
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The state also requested a pre-trial ruling on the admissibility of expert 
testimony "regarding domestic violence dynamics." (R., pp.65A-65H.) Parton 
filed a written objection to the state's motion.2 (R., p.73.) Although the record 
does not contain a specific ruling on the state's motion, the use of a domestic 
violence expert was discussed at a pre-trial conference.3 (4/29/2010 Tr., p.2, L.9 
- pA, L.13.) At that conference, the state noted it disclosed two potential experts 
- Detective Matt Brechwald and Ladessa Foster. (4/29/2010 Tr., p.2, Ls.10-14.) 
The state further noted a possible "issue" with using Detective Brechwald as its 
expert because "he did listen to one jail call associated with this case." 
(4/29/2010 Tr., p.2, Ls.16-18.) The state represented that, if used as an expert, 
Detective Brechwald would not discuss the jail call, but inquired whether .this 
would "prohibit him from being the state's expert." (4/29/2010 Tr., p.2, Ls.21-23; 
p.3, LsA-11.) The court indicated it would not and defense counsel did not 
otherwise object. (4/29/2010 Tr., p.3, LA - pA, L.13.) Implicit in this discussion 
is that the court granted the state's motion to present expert testimony on the 
dynamics of domestic violence. Both Detective Brechwald and Ms. Foster 
ultimately testified attrial. (See generally Trial Tr., Vol. I, pp.158-173, 296-317.) 
2 The objection included in the record consists of a single-page pleading entitled 
"Motion in Limine and Objection to State's Trial Memorandum Re Expert 
Testimony." (R., p.73.) That pleading states: "In support, Defendant offers a 
brief, which is now on file with the Court" (R., p.73), which appears to have been 
filed on April 1, 2010 (R, p.5). The brief, however, is not included in the record 
on appeal. 
3 While the record does not include a transcript of a hearing on the state's motion 
regarding a domestic violence expert, the prosecutor's statements at the pre-trial 
conference suggest there was argument on the issue at some point. (4/29/2010 
Tr., pA, Ls.5-7.) 
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The jury found Parton guilty of both charges - attempted strangulation and 
felony domestic battery. (R., p.96.) The jury also found Parton is a persistent 
violator. (R., p.98.) Parton filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, which the 
court denied. (R., pp.114-115, 121-122.) The court subsequently imposed a 
unified 25 year sentence with five years fixed for attempted strangulation and a 
concurrent 10-year sentence with five years fixed for felony domestic battery. 
(R., pp.142-144.) Parton filed a timely appeal. (R., pp.148-150.) 
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ISSUES 
Parton states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it allowed Detective Brechwald 
to testify as an expert about specifics of this case? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted, as 
an excited utterance, a statement made by the victim to the 
police? 
3. Is Mr. Parton entitled to a new trial under the cumulative 
error doctrine? 
4. Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's finding that 
Mr. Parton was a persistent violator? 
5. Did the prosecuting attorney violate Mr. Parton's Fifth 
Amendment rights when, without objection, she solicited 
testimony as to his pre-arrest silence, his post-arrest 
invocation of his right to counsel, and commented on his 
silence in her closing argument? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.g.) 
The State rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Parton failed to establish error in the admission of Detective 
Brechwald's testimony? 
2. Was Theresa's initial statement to law enforcement admissible as a prior 
consistent statement such that this Court need not address whether the court 
abused its discretion in concluding it was an excited utterance? Alternatively, 
has Parton failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in admitting 
the statement as an excited utterance? 
3. Has Parton failed to establish he is entitled to relief based on cumulative 
error? 
4. Was there substantial competent evidence to support the jury's verdict 
finding Parton guilty of being a persistent violator? 
5. Has Parton failed to show fundamental error in relation to the prosecutor's 




Parton Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Allowing Detective Brechwald To Testify, Based On His Expertise With Domestic 
Violence, About The Significance Of Parton's Statements To Theresa After He 
Battered Her 
A. I ntrod uction 
Parton contends the district court abused its discretion in allowing 
Detective Brechwald to testify about the evidentiary value of recorded calls 
Parton made to Theresa after he was arrested. (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) 
Specifically, Parton claims the testimony was irrelevant, improper expert 
testimony, and improper opinion testimony by a lay witness. Parton's releva,nce 
claim and his claim that the testimony constituted an improper opinion by a lay 
witness fail because neither claim is preserved. Parton's claim that the testimony 
was improper expert testimony also fails because the record supports the 
conclusion that Detective Brechwald's testimony is admissible under Idaho Rule 
of Evidence 702. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The admissibility of expert testimony is discretionary and will not be 
disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. Crea, 
119 Idaho 352,806 P.2d 445 (1991); State v. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29,909 P.2d 
647 (Ct. App. 1996). 
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C. Parton Has Failed To Establish Reversible Error In Relation To The 
Admission Of Detective Brechwald's Testimony 
At trial, Detective Brechwald testified regarding his extensive experience 
in domestic violence. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.29S, L.15 - p.302, LA.) Based on that 
expertise, the state asked Detective Brechwald to listen to recorded calls 
between Theresa and Parton following Parton's arrest and testify regarding the 
"evidentiary value" of those calls. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.307, LsA-16; p.312, LS.7-
11.) Detective Brechwald responded: 
Actually, I found it to have significant evidentiary value. To 
begin with, he makes obvious attempts to influence her in how 
she's going to proceed and how she's going to speak with people 
who conduct follow-up investigations in the prosecutor's office. 
In addition, he expresses his disappointment that she did not 
make up a story about getting in a fight with a chick in the bar. 
In addition, he never denies that he did this. I think that's 
strong, compelling evidence in a case like this. 
And then beyond that, as she goes down the list of the 
things that he did to her, he acknowledges all those things. He 
says, "I know, I know, I know." 
(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.312, L.12 - p.313, L.2.) 
Parton objected, stating: "It doesn't characterize. He says, 'I'm sorry, I'm 
sorry, I'm sorry, but I don't remember a lick of it.' He does not say, 'I know.'" 
(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.313, Ls.3-6.) The court responded that the jury heard the 
audio and could decide what is said. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.313, Ls.7-S.) The 
prosecutor then asked Detective Brechwald to continue with his answer, which 
he did, stating: "Well, as he responds to her saying what he had done to her, you 
know, there's no denials. He apologizes several times." (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.313, 
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Ls.10-15.) Parton interposed what he characterized as a "continuing objection," 
arguing: "The jury's heard the calls. They are going to have the opportunity to 
discuss it. I don't think they need Detective Brechwald to tell them what the calls 
said." (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.313, Ls.16-20.) The court, the prosecutor and counsel 
for Parton then engaged in the following exchange: 
THE COURT: So what's the purpose of the questioning? 
[PROSECUTOR]: This is, based on his training and experience 
as a domestic violence detective, what evidentiary value did he 
consider this piece of evidence to have on his investigation. 
THE COURT: Based on his expertise in domestic violence? 
[PROSECUTOR]: Yes. And his investigation. As a domestic 
violence detective in this case -- well, limited to the calls. 
[COUNSEL]: And it's been represented that he was not a detective 
in this particular case. He's simply offering an opinion with respect 
to these calls. And the jury is entirely capable of drawing their 
conclusions from having listened to them. 
THE COURT: I think she's offering it as an expert opinion; is 
that right, or what? 
[PROSECUTOR]: I mean, certainly I think he has expertise in the 
area of domestic violence but I'm limiting, you know, to those three 
calls that we heard, as a detective, what inferences or what 
evidentiary value do these calls have. 
THE COURT: 
you're --
To assist the jury to understand; is that way 
[PROSECUTOR]: Well, Your Honor--
THE COURT: Okay. In his investigation as a detective with 
the Boise City Police Department, having experience and expertise 
in the area of domestic violence? 
[PROSECUTOR]: Yes. With regard to those three calls, were 
they of evidentiary value? 
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THE COURT: I think it's okay. 
[COUNSEL]: Same objection, Judge. I don't think expert 
testimony is at all necessary here, Judge. If he was here 
testifying about the length of skid marks and saying that that shows 
a car was going so fast or here testifying about ballistics or 
something of that nature. But this is within the realm of human 
experience, and the jury are the finders of fact. They're all 
adults and they have experience with telephones and human 
relationships. I think it is up to them to determine what these 
calls say. 
[PROSECUTOR]: And I'm not offering him right now as an expert 
under 702. He is a fact witness with regard to these calls because 
he heard them with his own ears. He wrote a police report about 
them that's been provided to defense counsel. So it's not an expert 
in terms of 702, but he does have some additional expertise in the 
area that would ultimately --
THE COURT: So based on an investigation to determine 
whether or not domestic violence occurred, he's listened to these 
calls. And then he would draw some conclusions from that in 
determining whether or not a person should or should not be 
prosecuted or what? 
[PROSECUTOR]: Just what, if any, evidentiary value they had. 
He wrote a police report regarding them, so I could ask him why --
THE COURT: I'm not sure this is much different than a DUI 
evaluation. It seems to be in the realm of an investigative officer's 
duty as to what evidence that they would look at in putting together 
a case. 
[COUNSEL]: I'm not withdrawing the objection. You can rule 
as you choose, but I maintain the objection. But I think it is up to 
the jury to determine what these calls mean to them. They are the 
ultimate finders of fact. And having just listened to them, I don't 
think they need someone else to tell them what the calls said. 
THE COURT: I agree that it's up to the jury to determine what 
weight they happen to give to all the evidence as well as this 
officer's testimony, but I'll allow the officer to testify. 
(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.313, L.21 - p.316, L.23 (emphasis added).) 
After resolving Parton's objection, Detective Brechwald concluded: 
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I think the nature of the manipulation that you can hear in the call, 
with the threats to hang himself and the threats to kill himself, and 
kind of switching the momentum in the relationship to where he's 
the victim and she should be worried about him; because of all of 
this, now he's going to hang himself in the shower. And garnering 
promises that she will stand by him, making extreme efforts to 
make sure that she maintains the relationship, making suggestions 
that -- don't let somebody else come in and screw up this 
relationship; how long will you stand by me for; you have to stand 
by me. Those type of manipulative efforts are something that, as a 
domestic violence detective I'm always looking for, because that is 
ingrained in this type of crime. 
(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.317, Ls.5-20.) 
On appeal, Parton argues Detective Brechwald's testimony was 
inadmissible asserting the testimony was irrelevant and improper under I.R.E. 
701 and 702. (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Parton's arguments fail. 
At the outset, Parton erroneously asserts that "[w]hile the language used 
in making the objections could hardly be described as a model of clarity," Parton 
objected to the testimony on three grounds: "(1) relevance, (2) calling for opinion 
testimony of an expert when it would not assist the trier of fact, and (3) calling for 
opinion testimony by a lay witness when it was not appropriate to do so." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Notwithstanding Parton's assertion to the contrary, it is 
not "obvious that defense counsel's first objection . . . was an objection on 
relevance grounds." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Rather, Parton's objection from 
the outset, and his "continuing objection" to Detective Brechwald's testimony, 
was that the jury did not need Detective Brechwald's assistance in interpreting 
the meaning of Parton's statements. This is not an objection based on 
relevance. Nor is it "equally obvious" that Parton made an objection under I.R.E. 
701. (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Parton's only objection to Detective Brechwald's 
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testimony was that the calls were something the jurors heard and could interpret 
themselves such that they did not require Detective Brechwald's expertise to 
assist them. Parton's objection on this single ground is inadequate to preserve 
whatever other objections he thinks should or could have been made at trial. 
State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 885, 119 P.3d 653, 660 (Ct. App. 2005) 
(citations omitted) ("An objection on one ground will not preserve a separate and 
different basis for excluding the evidence."). This Court should, therefore, 
decline to consider Parton's claims that Detective Brechwald's testimony was 
inadmissible for any reason other than the claim that it was improper under I.R.E. 
702. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010) ("Generally 
Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved for appeal through 
an objection at trial."). 
Parton acknowledges he objected to Detective Brechwald's testimony on 
the ground that it "call[ed] for opinion testimony of an expert when it would not 
assist the trier of fact," but he does not address whether the testimony was 
admissible under I.R.E. 702, presumably in light of the prosecutor's position 
below that she was not offering it as expert testimony. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-
14.) While the prosecutor affirmatively asserted she was "not offering [Detective 
Brechwald] as an expert under 702" (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.315, Ls.16-17), the state's 
questioning was based on Detective Brechwald's specific expertise and it is 
readily apparent that the court viewed Detective Brechwald as an expert even if it 
is not entirely clear that the court admitted the testimony on this basis (see Trial 
Tr., Vol. I, p.314, Ls.2-3, 13-14). Regardless, this Court can affirm on any basis 
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supported by the record. Total Success Investments, LLC v. Ada County 
Highway Dist., 148 Idaho 688, 696, 227 P.3d 942, 950 (Ct. App. 2010) ("an 
appellate court may affirm the district court's decision if an alternative legal basis 
supports it") (citations omitted). Application of the correct legal standard to the 
facts supports the conclusion that Detective Brechwald could provide expert 
testimony explaining the interplay between the dynamics of domestic violence 
and the statements Parton made to Theresa following his arrest. 
"To be admissible, the expert's testimony must assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." State v. Joslin, 145 
Idaho 75, 81, 175 P.3d 764, 770 (2007) (quotations omitted); see also I.R.E. 702. 
"The function of the expert is to provide testimony on subjects that are beyond 
the common sense, experience and education of the average juror." State v. 
Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33,42,966 P.2d 33, 42 (Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted). 
Only where the normal experience of the jurors permits them to draw proper 
conclusions from the facts and circumstances are expert conclusions or opinions 
inadmissible. 1.!;L 
Expert testimony "about the effects of domestic violence on victims" is 
admissible. See State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848,855,26 P.3d 31, 38 (2001); see 
also Com. v. Goetzendanner, 679 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) 
(citations omitted) ("We conclude, as have courts in other jurisdictions, that the 
pattern of behavioral and emotional characteristics common to the victims of 
battering lies beyond the ken of the ordinary juror and may properly be the 
subject of expert testimony."). Parton not only fails to challenge this underlying 
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premise in the context of Detective Brechwald's testimony, he asserts no error in 
relation to Ms. Foster, who also offered expert testimony on the dynamics of 
domestic violence. (See generally Trial Tr., Vol. I, pp.158-173.) The ultimate 
point of Detective Brechwald's testimony was to explain the domestic violence 
principles related to Parton's manipulative behavior toward Theresa, which would 
help assist the jury in understanding her actions and her previous recantation, 
just as Ms. Foster's testimony assisted in that regard. Because this was proper 
evidence under I.R.E. 702, Parton has failed to establish error in the admission of 
Detective Brechwald's testimony. 
Even if this Court concludes Detective Brechwald's testimony was not 
properly admitted, any error in its admission is harmless in light of Ms. Foster's 
testimony, which provided the jury with a similar background for understanding 
Theresa's relationship with Parton and in light of the strength of the evidence 
against Parton, which is discussed in more detail in section IV, infra. 
II. 
Parton Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Allowing Officer Moreno To Testify That Theresa Told Him Her Boyfriend Beat 
Her Up 
A. I ntrod uction 
Parton contends "the district court abused its discretion when it admitted, 
as an excited utterance, a statement made by the victim to the police." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.15.) Parton's claim fails because regardless of whether the 
statement was an excited utterance, Theresa's statement that her boyfriend beat 
her up was admissible as a prior consistent statement. Even if the statement did 
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not qualify as such, Parton has failed to establish the district court abused its 
discretion in admitting the statement as an excited utterance. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The decision whether to admit evidence at trial is generally within the 
province of the trial court." State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 734, _,264 P.3d 75, 77 
(Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted). "[A] trial court's determination as to the 
admission of evidence at trial will only be reversed where there has been an 
abuse of that discretion." lfL. 
C. Theresa's Statement That Her Boyfriend Beat Her Up Was Admissible As 
A Prior Consistent Statement; Alternatively Parton Has Failed To Show 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Admitting The Statement As An 
Excited Utterance 
Prior to trial, the district court ruled that the state would be permitted to 
introduce evidence that Theresa told Officer Moreno when he discovered her 
outside the police substation that her boyfriend beat her up. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, 
p.56, L.18 - p.57, L.4.) At that point, the state indicated its intent to offer the 
statement as an excited utterance and the district court agreed that it qualified as 
such. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.45, L.5 - p.47, L.25; p.57, Ls.18-24.) 
Consistent with the court's pre-trial ruling, Officer Moreno testified that he 
discovered Theresa on the ground outside the substation and she said: "I need 
help ... [m]y boyfriend beat me up." (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.182, Ls.22-23.) Officer 
Moreno's testimony did not, however, occur until after Theresa testified. Much of 
Parton's cross-examination of Theresa focused on the fact that her testimony at 
the preliminary hearing was different than her trial testimony in that Theresa 
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testified at the preliminary hearing that Parton did not batter her whereas her trial 
testimony was completely contrary. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, pp.150-154.) This line of 
questioning was consistent with Parton's opening statement where he referenced 
Parton's preliminary hearing testimony and asked: "Is she willing to lie here 
today?" (5/3/2010 Tr., p.6, Ls.9-18.) Thus, central to Parton's defense and his 
questioning of Theresa was "an express or implied charge against [her] of recent 
fabrication or improper influence or motive." I.R.E. 801 (d)(1). The state was 
permitted to rebut this attack with Theresa's prior consistent statement to Officer 
Moreno that Parton beat her up. Id. This Court, therefore, need not address 
whether Theresa's statement to Officer Moreno satisfied the excited utterance 
exception to the hearsay rule because the statement was not hearsay at all. Id.; 
Vondenkamp, supra. 
Even if this Court concludes that Theresa's statement to Officer Moreno 
that Parton beat her up does not constitute a prior consistent statement under 
I.R.E. 801 (d)(1), Parton has failed to establish the district court abused its 
discretion in admitting it under the excited utterance exception. 
Rule 803(2) provides that "[a] statement relating to a startling event or 
condition made while the declarant is under the stress of excitement caused by 
the event or condition" is "not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available as a witness." The excited utterance exception "has two 
requirements: (1) an occurrence or event sufficiently startling to render 
inoperative the normal reflective thought process of an observer; and (2) the 
statement of the declarant must have been a spontaneous reaction to the 
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occurrence or event and not the result of reflective thought." State v. Field, 144 
Idaho 559, 568, 165 P.3d 273, 282 (2007) (citations omitted). In deciding 
whether a statement satisfies this exception, the Court considers the totality of 
the circumstances "including: 'the amount of time that elapsed between the 
startling event and the statement, the nature of the condition or event, the age 
and condition of the declarant, the presence or absence of self-interest, and 
whether the statement was volunteered or made in response to a question.'" kL 
(quoting State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 325, 986 P.2d 346, 348 (Ct. App. 
1999)). The district court, applying these factors to the circumstances 
surrounding Theresa's statement to Officer Moreno, correctly concluded that the 
statement was admissible as an excited utterance. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.54, L.7 -
p.56, L.17 (discussing factors).) 
Parton acknowledges "that the nature of the startling event was something 
that could have produced an excited utterance," but contends "that a statement 
made by an adult victim of domestic violence, who fell asleep between the 
startling event and the making of the statement, cannot be an excited utterance." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.16-17.) Parton's argument places undue weight on 
Theresa's characterization of what occurred between the time she reached the 
substation and the time the officers discovered her lying outside the door. While 
Theresa testified that she thought she may have fallen asleep while waiting for 
the officers to find her after unsuccessfully trying to get their attention by 
knocking on the door, it is equally possible that she was losing consciousness as 
a result of the beating inflicted by Parton. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.27, Ls.12-24; p.122, 
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Ls.15-23.) In fact, Theresa testified that she lost consciousness at one point 
during the attack (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.107, Ls.15-17), and Dr. John Alquist, who 
examined Theresa at the hospital, testified that Theresa exhibited signs of a 
head injury in the form of nausea and disorientation (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.271 , LS.7-
12, p.272, L.16 - p.273, L.18), which would have been consistent with Theresa's 
testimony that Parton was beating her head into the floor (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.106, 
Ls.19-20). Further, at the hearing on the state's motion regarding the 
admissibility of her statements, Theresa indicated she did not know if she fell 
asleep "or what" because she "just hurt."4 (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.27, Ls.23-24.) 
Moreover, regardless of whether Theresa was asleep or semi-conscious 
during the brief interval between when she stopped knocking and when the 
officers discovered her, she was still "under the stress of excitement caused by 
the event or condition" as evidenced by her demeanor and response when 
Officer Moreno and Officer Rosier encountered her, both of whom characterized 
her as upset, crying, and fearful. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.183, Ls.22-23; p.235, Ls.1-2.) 
Based on the totality of the circumstances, Parton has failed to establish 
the district court abused its discretion in admitting, as an excited utterance, 
Theresa's statement to Officer Moreno that her boyfriend beat her up. Even if 
the Court concludes otherwise, any error is harmless in light of the weight of the 
evidence against Parton. 
4 Even when Theresa testified at trial that she thought she fell asleep rather than 
losing consciousness, the only basis for that belief was that she "felt something 
hit [her] leg." (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.122, Ls.19-23.) This does not, however, rule out 
the possibility that she lost consciousness. 
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III. 
Parton Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error 
"The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a conviction when there 
is 'an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, 
but when aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in contravention 
of the defendant's constitutional right to due process." State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 
576, _, 261 P.3d 853, 871 (2011) (citations, quotations and alteration omitted). 
A necessary predicate to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding 
of more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P .2d 22 (Ct. App. 
1998). In addition, cumulative error analysis does not include errors neither 
objected to nor found fundamental. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 
961, 982 (2010). 
Parton claims the errors he alleges in relation to Detective Brechwald's 
testimony and Officer Moreno's testimony regarding Theresa's statement that her 
boyfriend beat her up entitle him to relief under the cumulative error doctrine. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.18.) Parton's claim fails because he has failed to show any 
error, much less two or more errors. The doctrine of cumulative error, therefore, 
does not apply in this case. 
IV. 
There Was Substantial Competent Evidence From Which The JUry Could 
Conclude, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, That Parton Is A Persistent Violator 
A. Introduction 
Parton asserts there was insufficient evidence presented to support the 
jury's verdict finding him guilty of being a persistent violator. (Appellant's Brief, 
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pp.18-22.) Specifically, Parton contends the judgment offered as Exhibit 32 was 
inadequate because it was "not supported by substantial evidence that he is the 
person named therein." (Appellant's Brief, p.22.) Parton is incorrect. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence is limited in scope." State 
v. Marsh, 2011 WL 6430816 *4 (Ct. App. 2011). An appellate court will not set 
aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict if there is substantial 
evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 
288,292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 
826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 
1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting this review the appellate court will not 
substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight 
to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 
101,822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761,735 P.2d at 1072. 
Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed 
in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; 
Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P .2d at 1072. 
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C. Exhibit 32 Constitutes Substantial, Competent Evidence That Parton Was 
Previously Convicted Of Felony Third Degree Assault For Purposes Of 
The Persistent Violator Enhancement 
In support of its allegation that Parton is a persistent violator, the state 
offered two certified judgments of conviction, identified as Exhibits 32 and 33. 
(5/4/2010 Tr., p.51, Ls.11-16.) Based on this evidence, the jury convicted Parton 
of being a persistent violator. (R., p.98.) 
On appeal, Parton does not challenge the adequacy of Exhibit 33 in 
support of the persistent violator enhancement, but contends Exhibit 325 "is not 
supported by substantial evidence that he is the person named therein." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.22.) A review of the record shows Parton's claim is without 
merit. 
Exhibit 32, which was offered and admitted, without objection, as a self-
authenticating document indicates the defendant, "Darin William Parton," date of 
birth " pled guilty to assault in the third degree. (5/4/2010 Tr., p.51, 
L.10 - p.53, L.9; Exhibit 32.) Consistent with this identifying information, Officer 
Rosier testified Parton's full name is "Darin William Parton," and his date of birth 
is " (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.256, L.10 - p.257, L.11.) 
Parton correctly notes, "A judgment of conviction bearing the same name 
as the defendant, with nothing more, is insufficient to establish the identity of the 
person formerly convicted beyond a reasonable doubt." (Appellant's Brief, p.21 
(quoting State v. Medrain, 143 Idaho 329, 144 P.3d 34 (Ct. App. 2006)).) The 
evidence offered by the state in this case, however, is not so limited. Exhibit 32, 
5 A copy of Exhibit 32 is attached hereto as Appendix A. 
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in addition to reflecting Parton's exact full name, also reflected the same date of 
birth offered as evidence in the state's case-in-chief. While the state did not offer 
the types of evidence previously included in considering the sufficiency of 
evidence in other cases involving a challenge to a persistent violator 
enhancement, such as fingerprints, mug shots, and a social security number, 
see, SUl., Marsh at *4-5, State v. Martinez, 102 Idaho 875, 643 P.2d 555 (Ct. 
App. 1982), this does not mean the evidence submitted in this case was 
insufficient. Evidence that a felony judgment was previously entered against an 
individual with the exact same name and exact same birthday as Parton was 
sufficient for the jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Parton was 
the same person formerly convicted pursuant to the judgment admitted as Exhibit 
32. 
Parton has failed to establish the state presented insufficient evidence to 
support the jury's verdict finding him guilty of being a persistent violator. 
V. 
Parton Has Failed To Establish The Prosecutor's Questions And Arguments 
Relating To His Statements To Law Enforcement Constitute Fundamental Error 
Requiring Reversal Of His Convictions 
A. Introduction 
Parton contends for the first time on appeal that the state violated his Fifth 
Amendment rights by "elicit[ing] testimony concerning his pre-arrest silence, his 
post-arrest invocation of his right to counsel" and by "comment[ing] on his silence 
during closing argument." (Appellant's Brief, p.23.) Application of the legal 
standards governing claims of fundamental error to the facts of this case reveals 
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Parton has failed to satisfy his burden of establishing he is entitled to reversal of 
his convictions. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved 
for appeal through an objection at trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 
976. Where a claim is raised for the first time on appeal, the appellate court will 
consider whether the error alleged qualifies as fundamental error. kL at 228, 245 
P.3d at 980. 
C. Parton Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error In Relation To The 
Prosecutor's Questions Regarding His Statements Or Based On The 
Prosecutor's Closing Argument 
In opening statements, counsel for Parton advised the jury: 
There will be a number of witnesses testifying. Perhaps a couple of 
police officers, a nurse, maybe a paramedic or two, and [Theresa]. 
And as fact would have it, the only person who actually knows what 
happened that night would be [Theresa]. 
Because the police are going to come in and say that the 
only thing they know about her injuries, are what she reported to 
them. They didn't see it. They weren't there. They don't know 
what actually happened. The same thing with the paramedics. 
They can say, well, we saw her. She got some injuries. We took 
her to the hospital. She appeared to stabilize, but, the only thing I 
know is what she told her. And the same thing if there's a nurse 
that testifies. Same thing. No, I wasn't there. I didn't see it. I don't 
know how it happened. This is what she told me. 
And we're going to hear from a doctor who's going to say the 
same thing. I wasn't there. I didn't see it. I don't know what 
happened, but this is what she told me. 
Ana [Theresa] is going to testify back on October 16, 17, 
more than a month later at preliminary hearing, she came in and 
testified that she was asleep; they had, in fact, been out drinking 
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together, and she was asleep on the couch. Mr. Parton fell on her. 
She was shocked. She's going to tell you that she suffers from 
PTSD and panic disorder, and she panicked and jumped around 
and fell off the couch, slammed her head into a table. And she's 
going to tell you also that they have a couple of Dachsunds that 
ended up clawing her up to some degree. It would be our position 
that they also clawed at Mr. Parton. If you see his booking photo, 
you'll see that he's got scratches down his face that were alluded to 
by the state today. 
And she's going to tell you that she testified to that at the 
preliminary hearing. She's also going to testify that [at another 
hearing] she came in here and swore under oath that she lied at the 
preliminary hearing, under oath, having taken that oath, swearing to 
tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and sat 
there and lied . 
. . . So the only person who really knows what happened to her that 
night -- later you'll likely hear from today -- is [Theresa], who 
testifies under oath that she's willing to lie, and I'm going to ask you 
I to take that into very serious consideration in determining what to 
do here today. 
(5/3/2010 Tr., p.4, L.22 - p.7, L.10.) 
It was against this backdrop that the state proceeded with its presentation 
of evidence against Parton. This evidence included questions directed to Officer 
Moreno regarding his interaction with Parton before and after Parton was 
arrested. Parton complains that, despite his failure to object below, the following 
exchange resulted in a Fifth Amendment violation: 
Q: After, did he acknowledge that that was, in fact, his driver's 
license? 
A: He was very uncooperative with us. I don't think he even ever 
acknowledged that was him and that was his driver's license. Just 
very uncooperative with us. 




A: Just by his picture. 
Q: When you say he was uncooperative with you, what do you 
mean? What did that look like? 
A: Again, he was visibly angered, angry, and just not wanting - we 
would ask him to stand up and he wouldn't. He'd make his body 
limp and not being very cooperative. 
Q: And did he make any statements regarding why you were there 
or the events of the evening? 
A: As I recall, the only statement that I recall him making is that he 
didn't know what was going on. 
Q: And at some point was he under arrest? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And for what was he under arrest? 
A: For domestic battery and attempted strangulation. 
Q: Why was he under arrest at that time? 
A: Just based on Theresa's statements, her injuries and his lack of 
statements to us, telling us exactly what happened. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.24-25 (quoting Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.198, L.12 - p.199, L.17 
(bold in transcript and emphasis supplied by Parton omitted).) 
In order to prevail on his claim that the foregoing line of questioning 
constituted fundamental error, Parton must satisfy the three-part test articulated 
by the Idaho Supreme Court in Perry: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the 
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated, (2) the 
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including 
26 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error 
affected the defendant's substantial rights meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. 
150 Idaho at 226,245 P.3d 978. 
With respect to the first prong, Parton must demonstrate his silence was 
used against him for the purpose of implying guilt. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 
(1976) (A defendant's decision to exercise his or right to remain silent cannot be 
used at trial for the purpose of implying guilt, nor maya defendant's silence after 
he receives Miranda warnings be used for impeachment purposes.); State v. 
Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 820-821, 965 P.2d 174, 180-181 (1998); State v. Molen, 
148 Idaho 950,959,231 P.3d 1047, 1046 (Ct. App. 2010). A mere reference to 
silence is not, however, a violation of this right; a defendant claiming a due 
process violation must demonstrate that the state used the evidence to imply 
guilt. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 764-65 (1987) ("The fact of Miller's post-
arrest silence was not submitted to the jury as evidence from which it was 
allowed to draw any permissible inference, and thus no Doyle violation occurred 
in this case."); Ellen v. Brady, 475 F.3d 5, 10-11 (1 st Cir. 2007) (no constitutional 
error occurs if government not allowed to "use" silence to imply guilt). Law 
enforcement officers, like prosecutors, are also prohibited from improperly 
commenting on a defendant's silence. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, _,253 
P.3d 727,735 (2011). 
The prosecutor's question to Officer Moreno regarding what statements 
Parton made was not for the purpose of using Parton's silence to imply guilt. 
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Quite the opposite - the prosecutor's question itself asked Officer Moreno 
whether Parton made any statements, which he did. Officer Moreno's later 
statement regarding the reason for arresting Parton was just that - a statement 
about why Parton was arrested. It was not a statement intended to imply guilt 
from Parton's failure to provide his version of events. Compare State v. Lopez, 
141 Idaho 575, 114 P.3d 133 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that prosecutor implied 
guilt by emphasizing that Lopez failed to tell his version of events until trial). 
Even if Officer Moreno's testimony about Parton's statement that he did 
not know what was going on and his explanation of why Parton was arrested is 
enough to establish a Fifth Amendment violation, Parton cannot satisfy Perry's 
second or third prong. On prong two, Parton argues otherwise, asserting the 
error is plain "considering the clarity of the law on this subject, along with the fact 
that there could have been no reasonable strategic basis for defense counsel not 
to have objected." (Appellant's Brief, p.28.) That the law is clear that the state 
cannot use a defendant's silence to imply guilt does not, however, mean that it is 
clear that is what occurred; it is only Parton's most negative reading of the 
transcript that supports such a conclusion. It is possible trial counsel, who was 
present for the trial, may have not shared Parton's interpretation of the exchange 
and, therefore, found no reason to object. Trial counsel may have also declined 
to object for other reasons, including the sandbagging concern discussed in 
Perry. Simply saying the failure to object was not reasonable falls far short of 
demonstrating it was not intentional. Parton cannot, therefore, satisfy the second 
prong of Perry. 
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Parton's argument also fails the third Perry prong because he has failed to 
demonstrate that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings. The crux of 
Parton's argument that the error requires reversal is the fact that Theresa 
recanted during her preliminary hearing testimony and, somewhat ironically, his 
own decision not to testify at trial. Although Theresa readily admitted that she 
perjured herself at the preliminary hearing, she provided plausible reasons for 
doing so, which were supported by Ms. Foster's testimony explaining the 
dynamics of domestic violence and why victims might do precisely what Theresa 
did in this case. Theresa's trial testimony was also corroborated by other 
evidence, including her prior consistent statements, Dr. Alquist's conclusion that 
her injuries were consistent with what she said happened (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.295, 
Ls.9-12), and Parton's efforts to influence her testimony as reflected in the 
recorded phone calls. That Parton decided not to testify does not change the 
weight of the evidence against him, and his reliance on this fact is unpersuasive 
in light of his opening statement indicating he had nothing to say on the topic 
because Theresa was supposedly "the only person who actually knows what 
happened that night." (5/3/2010 Tr., p.4, L.25 - p.5, L.2.) 
Parton has failed to establish fundamental error in relation to his first Fifth 
Amendment allegation. 
Parton next contends fundamental error occurred "when the prosecutor 
questioned Officer Rosier about statements [he] made while being transported to 
jail." (Appellant's Brief, p.25.) That particular exchange was: 
Q: And did he make any statements on the way to the jail? 
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A: He did. 
Q: Tell the jury about those. 
A: He stated that he wanted to know what was going on. We'd told 
him several times up to this point what had been taking place, but 
he asked again, and I said because he didn't understand his rights 
that I wasn't going to talk to him. And at one point, he said he 
understood his rights and wanted to know what was going on, 
which at that point, I explained being arrested for domestic battery. 
And I believe he said that nothing happened, at which point I said 
"Do you remember beating up your girlfriend?" And at that time, he 
said he wanted his attorney, and so I stopped asking him questions 
at that time. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.25-26 (quoting Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.250, Ls.5-21).) 
Parton asserts "it is difficult to understand why a prosecutor would ask an 
open-ended question about statements made by [him] knowing that the 
statements ended with an invocation of the right to counsel" and complains the 
"broad scope of the question was completely unnecessary, and, again, resulted 
in the admission of testimony that was improper and in violation of [his] Fifth 
Amendment rights." (Appellant's Brief, p.27.) Contrary to Parton's 
characterization, however, the prosecutor's question was not "open-ended" and 
"broad" - it was quite precise. The prosecutor merely asked the officer to tell the 
jury what "statements" Parton made on the way to the jail. She did not ask him to 
explain the circumstances surrounding the statements. That the officer did so 
does not demonstrate impropriety in the question. Compare Ellington, 151 Idaho 
at _, 253 P.3d at 733-734 (holding that the question "And so you did not 
interview him?" regardless of whether it was phrased in a way to avoid any 
comment on silence was irrelevant and unnecessary leading the Court to 
conclude the purpose was to draw attention to the defendant's silence). That 
30 
said, the state acknowledges it was improper for the jury to hear evidence of 
Parton's invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel such that the first 
prong of Perry is likely satisfied. This unobjected-to error, however, fails under 
the second and third prongs. 
Regarding the plain error prong, there is still the need for additional 
information not included in the record regarding counsel's decision not to object. 
Because it is plausible that counsel may have declined to object in order to avoid 
emphasizing the point or for the purposes of sandbagging, Parton cannot satisfy 
prong two. And, for the reasons previously articulated, Parton has failed to 
demonstrate the error affected his substantial rights. 
Parton's final Fifth Amendment claim relates to the prosecutor's closing 
argument. The comment about which Parton complains for the first time on 
appeal appears in italics in the following context: 
. .. Overall, the pictures and the testimony, again, corroborate 
what she told you happened. The bruising, injuries to her head. 
Despite, essentially, the perjury that [Theresa] committed at 
the preliminary hearing in this case, the reasons to believe [her] far 
outweigh the reasons not to believe her. 
We also have the option to believe the defendant. At the 
scene, he was inconsistent. He told Officer Rosier, first, that he 
didn't do anything, and then that he didn't remember anything. 
Well, which one is it? You either didn't do anything or you don't 
remember. Which one? 
He didn't acknowledge or provide any explanation for the 
significant injuries to this face. And you saw those pictures. Those 
are significant injures that he had. 
Finally, defendant's own words corroborate Teresa's [sic] 
testimony at trial. We have a lot of other corroboration including his 
own words that you heard live today. . 
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(5/4/2010 Tr., p.30, Ls.1-22 (emphasis added).) 
Parton asserts "the prosecutor inexplicably referred directly to [his] silence 
when she argued that his failure to explain his injuries was evidence of his guilt." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.28.) To the contrary, the prosecutor was not arguing that 
Parton's failure to explain his injuries was evidence of his guilt. When read in 
context, it appears the prosecutor was explaining the evidence that corroborated 
Theresa's trial testimony, versus her preliminary hearing testimony, and why the 
jury could reject Parton's inconsistent statements to law enforcement, made in 
conjunction with this failure to explain the source of his injuries, which he 
suggested in opening were the result of the dogs scratching him when Theresa 
supposedly injured herself during a panic attack. "Looking at the comments in 
context, including the likely effect of any curative instructions, ... the language 
used was [not] manifestly intended or was [not] of such character that the jury 
would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of [Parton] 
to testify." State v. McMurry, 143 Idaho 312, 315, 143 P.3d 400, 403 (Ct. App. 
2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted, emphasis original). See Darden 
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179 (1986) ("[t]he prosecutors' comments must be 
evaluated in light of the defense argument that preceded it"); State v. Severson, 
147 Idaho 694,719,215 P.3d 414, 439 (2009) (citation and quotations omitted) 
(prosecutor's arguments must be evaluated "in light of defense conduct and in 
the context of the entire trial") McMurry, 143 Idaho at 315, 143 P.3d at 403 
(citation and quotations omitted) ("a prosecutor may rebut defense counsel's 
arguments and defenses" even though "the line between a legitimate rebuttal of 
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the defense arguments and an indirect comment on the fact that the defendant 
has not taken the stand is often a very thin one"). Under the facts of this case, 
Parton has failed to show constitutional error in relation to the prosecutor's 
closing argument. 
Even if the prosecutor's closing argument resulted in constitutional error, 
for the reasons set forth above in relation to Parton's first claim of fundamental 
error, he has failed to establish either that the error was clear or obvious and the 
lack of objection was not the result of a tactical decision or that the result of the 
trial would have been different absent the prosecutor's comments. Parton has 
therefore failed to establish any error entitling him to reversal of his convictions. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Parton's convictions 
for attempted strangulation and felony domestic violence. 
DATED this 31 st day of January, 2012. 
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF 
STATE OF WASHINGTON, 
vS. 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE 
Plainti 1f , 
CAUSE NO. 95-1-00028-4 
JUDGMENT AND, SENTENCE 
(FELONY)' 





I. , HEARING 
1.1 A sentencing hearihg in this case-was held on 
" ' 
: . " 
1.2' The defendant, the defendant'slawye'r, BRAD POOLE, and the deputy 
14 prosecuting attorney, H. ' EBEN GORBATY, were present. 
15 , r I. FINDINGS 
16 There being no reason why judgment should not be pronounced, the court 
17 FINDS: 
18 2~ 1 CURRENT. OFFENSES ( S) : The defendant was found gui lty on 03/01/95 by 
19 (X]pl'ea [ ] jury-verdi~t [] bench trial of: " 
20 Count No.: 1. ' 
C rime: :...,:A=S=S:.:..A:.,:U:.,:L:::.,.T,--:::...I N:..:.-..:..T..:..,;H:.::E::.,.' ....;T:....:H..:..I:..:R~D_' .=D;,::E:.:G:.,:.R.:..:E::E=-, C ha rg e Cod e : ( E36 ) 
21 RCW:9A.36.031(1)(f) 
Date of Crime: DECEMBER 31, 1994-
22 IncidentNo~:94~365-0814 
23 
[] Additional current riffenses are attached in Appendix 2.1. 
24 [] A special verdict/finding f6r use of deadly weaponw~~ retur~ed 
on Co un t (s) . " ," 
25 tl A special verdict/finding of sexual motivation was returned on 
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.- ~. ' •• t 
[] A special verdict/finding of a RCW 69.50.401(a) violation in a 
school bus, public transit vehicle, public park, public transit 
shelter or within 1000 feet of a school bus route stop or the 
perimeter of a school grounds (ReW 69.50.435)~ 
[ ] Other current convictions listed under different cause numbers 
used in calculating the offender score are (list offense and cause 
number) : 
[] Current offenses encompassing the same criminal conduct and 
counting as one crime in determining the offender score are (RCW 
9.94A.400(1»: 
2.2 CRIMINAL HISTORY: Prior convictions constituting criminal history 
for purpose~ of calculating the offender score are (RCW 











[] Additional criminal history is attached in Appendix 2.2. 
[] Prior convictions served concurrently and counted as one o.ffense 
in determining the offender score are JRCW 9.94A.360(11): 
2.3 SENTENCING DATA: 











Pro ~; 0 -qo d~J 
[ ] Additional current offense sentencing data is 
attached in Appendix 2.3. 
2.4 EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCE: 
[] Substantial and compelling reasons exist which justify a sentence 
[ ) above [ ] below the standard range for Count(s). Findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are attached in Appendix 2.4. 
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Restitution will not be ordered because the felony did not result 
in injury to any person or damage to or loss of property. 
Restitution should be ordered. A hearing is set for 
Extraordinary circumstances exist that make restitution 
inappropriate. The extraordinary circumstaoce"s_ar.::e_setforthin 
Appendix 2.5. 
ABILITY TO PAY LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS: The court has 
considered the defendant's past, present and future ability to pay 
legal financial obI igations, including the: defendant's financial 
resources and the likelihood that the defendant's status wili 
change. The court specifically finds that the defendant has the 
ability to pay: 
no lega~ financial obligations. 
the following legal financial obligations: 





sheriff services fees~ etc.) 
county or, inte.rlocal drug funds. 
court appointed attorney's fees and cost of defense. 
fines. 
other financialob1.igations assessed as a result of the 
felony conviction. 
A notice of payroll deduction may be issued or ot.her income-
withholding action may be taken, ,without further notice to the offender, 
if a monthly court-ordered legal financial obligation payment is not 
paid when due and an amount equal to or greater than the amount payable 
for one month is owed. 
2.7 SPECIAL FINDINGS PURSUANT TO 
~ The defendant is a 
9.94A.030(20»who 
RCW 9.94A.120: 
first time offender (RCW 
shall be sentenced under the 
waiver of the presumptive sentence range pursuant to 
RCW 9.94A.120(S). 
[] The defendant is a sex offender who is eligible for 
the special sentencing alternative under RCW 
9.94A.120(7)(a). The court has determined, pursuant 
to'RCW 9~94A.120(7)(a){ii), that the special sex 
offender sentencing alternative is appropriate. 
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3.1 The defendant is GUILTY of the Counts and Charges listed in 
Paragraph 2.1 and Appendix 2.1. 
3.2 (] The court DISMISSES. 
IV. SENTENCE AND ORDER 
IT IS ORDERED: 














Court costs (filing fee, jury demand fee, witness 
costs, sheriff servic~ fees, etc.); 
Victim assessmentl 
Fine; (JVUCSA additional fine waived due to 
indigency (RCW 69.50.430); 
Fees for court appointed attorney; 
Washington State Patrol Crime Lab costs; 
Drug enforcement fund of ------------------------------; 
Other cos ts for: ____________________________________ _ 
TOTAL legal financial obligations [ J including 
restitution [ ] not including restitution. 
Payments shall not be less than $ ______ _ per month. Payments shall 
commence on 
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I 
[ ) R1stitution ordered above shall be paid jo~ntly and severally with: 
Name. Cause Number 
I 
The de~endant shall. remain under the court's jurisdiction and the 
s~perv~sion of the Department of Corrections for a period up to ten 
years" "'from the date of sentence or release from confinement to assure 
payment of the above monetary obligations~ . 
Any pejiOd of supervision shall be tolled during any period of time the 
offend r is in confinement for any reason~ 
Defend nt must contact the Depa.rtment of Corrections at 755 Tacoma 
Avenue South, Tacoma upon release or by' ___ ..,.-____ _ 
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FIRST TIME OFFENDER WAIVER OF PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCE: The court 
waives imposition of a sentence within the presumptive sentence 
range and imposes the following sentence pursuant to RCW 
9.94A.120(5): 
CONFINEMENT: Defendant shall serve a term of confinement 
Pierce County Jail as follows: 
( 1 
[ 1 
.18: days total confinement commencing 
days partial confinement commencing 
Partial confinement shall be served in work· release. 
P~rtial confinement shall b~ served in detention. 
[] Credit is given for ______ ...,.-__ days served. 
in 
( ] Confinement shall be intermittent as follows: 
COMMUNITY SUPERVISION: Defendant shall serve d~months in 
community supervision under the· Department of Corrections. 
Defendant must contact the Department of correc~' ons at 755 
Tacoma Avenue South, Tacoma upon release "U.F~ .... .~ 
Defendant shall comply with all rules, regulat£.OnSand' 
requirements of the Department. 
Any period of supervision shall be tolled during any period of time 
the offender is in confinement for any reason. 
[ ] COMMUNITY SERVICE: day shall be converted to 
hours of community service under the supervision of the 
Department of Corrections to be completed within 
of ( 1 this date ( ] release from cOnfinement. 
months 
[ ] CRIME RELATED PROHIBITIONS AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS: 
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HIVTESTING. The Health Department or designee shall test the 
defendant for HIV as soon as possible and the defendant shall 
fully cooperate in the testing. 
PURSUANT-TO 1993 LAWS OF WASHINGTON, CHAPTER 419; IF 
THIS OFFENDER IS FOUND TO BE. A CRIMINAL ALIEN ELIGIBLE 
FOR RELEASE AND DEPORTATION BY THE UNITED STATES 
IMMIGRATION. AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, SUBJECT TO 
ARREST AND- REINCA~CERATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS LAW, 
THEN THE UNDERSIGNED 'JUDGE AND PROSECUTOR CONSENT TO 
SUCH RELEASE AND DEPORTATION PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF 
THE SENTENCE •. 
EACH'VIOLATION OF THIS JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE IS PUNISHABLE BY UP TO 60 
DAYS OF CONFINEMENT. (RCW9.94A.200(2». 
. PURSUANT TO RCW' 10.73.,090 AND 10.73.100, THE DEFENDANT'S 
ANY KIND OF POST SENTEN E CHALLENGE TO THE CONVICTION 
MAY BE LI.MITED TO ONE A ~ ~,,' .. , 
Date: / 9 ~ , ~~~~Q~~~~~~.:.-
nab 
FIRST TIME OFFENDER - 2 
Approved as to form: 
--------------~ ( 
BRAD POOLE, 
Lawyer for Defendant 
WSB, # (Q..&0.3 
Office of Prosecuting Attorney 
946 County-City Building 
Tacoma, Washington 98402-2171 
Telephone: 591-7400 
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Fingerprint(s) of: DARIN WILLIAM PARTON 
/FILED 
(\ CRIMINAL DiV. 2 
. '-1~ OPEN COURT 
'-./ 
Attested by: ____ ~------~--~~~~~--~--~--------------~----~ 
By: DEPUTY CLERK ______ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~==--~Date:~~~--~-----
CERTIFICATE 
I , 
Cl~rk of this Court, certify th~t 
, th. above is a :~rue copy of the 
Judgment ~nd Sentence in this 
action on record in my office. > 
Dated :: .. ___________ ....... ____ -'-______ ~ 
CLERK · 




State I.D. #UNKNDWN 
Date of Birth  
Sex MALE , 
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